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ABSTRACT: Inspired by the notion of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ (Pendenza 2015a) – that combines at-
tachment to local territory and openness towards others – social relations on the part of Europeans are 
tested empirically. The article posits that this type of cosmopolitanism can exist in concomitance with oth-
er relational forms towards Otherness. Its main characteristic lies in the idea that it is not nourished by the 
abstract principle according to which such status can be attributed only if one feels a ‘citizen of the world’. 
On the contrary, without totally rejecting the idea, societal cosmopolitan mantains that if cosmopolitanism 
is to shrug off its abstraction, it requires a social anchorage to root it more firmly to real life. From a meth-
odological perspective, a contrastive analysis is putting in place relative to research carried out on Europe-
an cosmopolitanism and subsequently tested empirically using data from EB71.3. Findings showed that 
almost 25.0% (30-40% in specific countries) of the European citizens fit the description ‘societal cosmopoli-
tans’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European identity still appears to be hovering on the horizon – seemingly a thick 
cloud struggling for definition in a motley, contrasting scenario. A controversial identi-
ty, as many have defined it, whose cultural dimension can be traced to the European 
myth as narrated by the ancient Greeks (Bloch 1935; Febvre [1944–45] 1999; Hay 1957; 
Chabod 1961; Mikkeli 1998). Such a long history weighs heavily on the building of a col-
lective identity, the roots of which, though undeniably shared, are not sufficient to con-
tribute to the process of shaping a single European space. It is a commonplace to say 
that geographical borders exist: currently there are 28 countries comprising the Euro-
pean Union, all quite different from a political and cultural perspective, which render 
even more indeterminate the European social space. In this respect, countries such as 
Sweden, Great Britain and Denmark share a territory from an institutional (but not a 
monetary) perspective, as do Cyprus and Bulgaria. One day in the future perhaps, Is-
lamic Turkey will become part of the European Council and will discuss legislation and 
endorse treaties with Catholic countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy or with Or-
thodox Greece, its long-standing enemy. At the beginning, everything was much sim-
pler. The six founding countries of the European Economic Community were all Chris-
tian democracies and their common ground was far more extensive and defined. Now-
adays, such common ground is shrinking and in the future, obviously, will shrink even 
further, leaving room for only a controversial, abstract definition of common identity. If 
the political borders of Europe are now tending to shift towards the East (to Balkan, ex-
communist and Orthodox countries) as seems to be the case, then clearly, European 
policies will become less and less marked by substantial integration and more and 
more by formal integration. One might ask what can Western European Christians, 
Southern European Muslims and Eastern European Christian-Orthodox citizens possibly 
have in common? Perhaps, as Habermas’s (2001) concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
would maintain, might it be possible to forego a cultural identity in favour (hopefully) 
of a sense of European institutions? 
To aim at constituting a European society by means of a formal process of integra-
tion obviously bears its own risks and positive results cannot always be guaranteed, as 
the consequences of both economic integration (the Euro) and the economic institu-
tions governing the process (the European Central Bank and Free Trade Treaties) have 
proved. Notwithstanding, it is undeniable that strong efforts have been made in the di-
rection of effective European social and cultural integration. The EU can count on in-
creasing legislation and a Court of Justice capable of administering it. A series of 
measures already in place by virtue of the European treaties (concerning European citi-
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zenship, the Euro currency, a focus on the importance of human rights, and culture as a 
world heritage) has certainly determined a shift in attention on the part of European 
public opinion and far more stringent expectations from the European constitutive pro-
ject. However, while citizens are asking for more and for a better Europe, at the same 
time more Euro-sceptic and even anti-European attitudes are emerging. Thus certain 
individual and public behaviours, such as France’s and The Netherlands’ ‘no’ to the 
Constitutional Treaty of Europe, and the success of anti-European political parties in 
the recent 2014 European election, cast some doubts on the consensus reserved for 
the project, because Europe, it is said, must not be merely useful but must also be im-
bued with meaning. In other words, without a soul, what kind of Europe can it be (Ce-
rutti and Rudolph 2001)? 
From this perspective, efforts of interpretation and orientation are required of the 
social sciences and of sociology in particular (García-Faroldi 2008; 2009; Pendenza 
2012). Over recent decades the issue of Europe has erupted in various academic disci-
plines. Currently what is lacking is a general framework for interpreting the complex 
processes at work in Europe and globally, in order to frame events such as the rejection 
by France and The Netherlands of the EU Constitutional Treaty and the wide support 
for Marine Le Pen. At the same time, what is also lacking is more targeted research on 
specific transnational issues. In other words, sociological reflection on Europe requires 
more empirical investigation and more precise theoretical frames. For example, what 
exactly does ‘European society’ mean and can we state that it actually exists? Further-
more, sociology must test whether the analytical categories used to date in relation to 
national societies can in fact work for supra-national societies. Sociology has always 
reasoned in terms of national societies, such as French, Italian or German, and less of-
ten in terms of European, Asiatic, African or global societies nor of Padanian, Cataloni-
an or Basque societies, and so on. However, it now has to enquire whether and to what 
extent the ontology of the nation is still methodologically valid. This is necessary in or-
der to comprehend our present-day world, characterised as it is by a marked degree of 
global connectivity, blurred geographical borders, and lifestyles ever more impacted by 
local and global interlinks. 
Cosmopolitan sociology, with its revision of ‘methodological nationalism’ as one of 
its constituent traits, is currently moving along these lines (Beck 2002; Fine 2003; Cher-
nilo 2006; Turner 2006; Pendenza 2014a).1  One of the recurring questions concerns 
 
1 Cosmopolitan sociology is at the same time a new field of investigation and a different sociological 
approach to the analysis of the globalisation process and its outcomes. This field is characterised by a 
marked interdisciplinary nature and its focus is on processes of socialisation, by means of which individu-
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the cosmopolitan nature and shaping of Europe and its citizens (Habermas 2003; 
Delanty 2005; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck and Grande 2007; Rumford 2007). 
Cosmopolitan sociology, with its at times engagé attitudes, has often addressed Euro-
pean public opinion in terms of advocating an even more cosmopolitan Europe (see, 
for example, Habermas (2011) and Beck (2013)). However, its most significant 
achievement lies in having shown – better than other approaches – the actual delineat-
ing of cosmopolitan institutions in Europe and a growing cosmopolitan vision of Euro-
pean citizens, both of which are the result of transnational processes within and exter-
nal to European territory. By examining closely the tensions relative to European iden-
tity, scholars of cosmopolitan sociology have shown how such tensions are becoming 
subject to a much more self-reflexive and transformative process, the consequences of 
which could impact on people’s approach to the Other. In other words, they conclude 
that self-reflection on the issue of belonging both to local and to supra-national entities 
can effectively give rise to a genuine cosmopolitan identity. The observation of such a 
process is one of the remits of cosmopolitan sociology’s empirical research (Roudome-
tof 2005; Olofsson and Öhman 2007; Roudometof and Haller 2007; Pichler 2008, 
2009a/b; 2012; Haller and Routometof 2010). It has often happened that researchers 
have had to rely on secondary sources not really theoretically appropriate for cosmo-
politan framing. However, many authors have simply exploited such data to show that 
multiple identities and cosmopolitan social relations actually exist and are already 
widespread in Europe. Rather than the findings of such studies, what is of particular in-
terest to us is how cosmopolitanism has been conceptualised and operationalised. The 
main objective of our work is to frame the empirical evidence of a specific variety of 
cosmopolitanism, which we have defined as ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ (Pendenza 
2015a/b). 
 
 
2. Societal Cosmopolitanism: Rethinking Cosmopolitanism from a Local Per-
spective 
 
In its classical sense, cosmopolitanism is mainly a normative conception of the world 
and it develops in a variety of forms. This implies that a certain tension exists between 
the concept and its concrete expression. In this respect, cosmopolitanism can be envis-
aged as a value that embraces others within our vision (and us in theirs) seeking a 
 
als, social groups and institutions face the challenges of ever more transnational social phenomena. See 
Special Issue on CosmopolitanSociology in Quaderni di Teoria Sociale (Pendenza 2014b). 
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common point of reference which could be the world. From this point of view, cosmo-
politanism has both a universalistic and a liberal connotation, as its focus is on the obli-
gations individuals and their groups have towards one another outside their own mi-
lieu and its link with ‘human rights’. Notwithstanding, cosmopolitanism is not immune 
from post-colonialist criticism relative to the hegemonic role played by Europe and the 
West and from the accusation of abstract rationalism expressed by particular ‘contex-
tual theory’ approaches. This is especially true of cosmopolitan theory that, despite 
emphasising the value of openness towards others, highlights the role played by the 
historical-cultural context in validating the normative conception of cosmopolitanism. 
Both conceptions could be wrong or incomplete. Perhaps an intermediate position is 
more realistic: in other words, one that acknowledges at the same time the existence 
of particular universal human and individual capacities with respect to resolving specif-
ic issues and the fact that such solutions can be influenced, but not determined by, the 
cultural context. Is this feasible? Is there any proof? Is this theory effectively descrip-
tive of reality? The relation between cultural context, cognitive capacity and normative 
principles is highly contingent and always open to different outcomes. This makes di-
versity possible. Political philosophy claims this as a ‘justificationist’ approach (Haber-
mas 1996; Benhabib 2004), the focus of which is on procedures as opposed to assump-
tions. In contrast, in sociology it is sustained by the advocates of ‘critical cosmopolitan-
ism’ (Delanty 2006), for whom the focus is on the openness of encountering different 
cultures and their contaminating nature. In addition, from the perspective of societal 
cosmopolitanism we affirm the coexistence of a ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’, 
whereby societal cosmopolitanism has the specific capacity to think beyond the cultur-
al context without detachment from it (Pendenza 2015a/b). In other words, societal 
cosmopolitanism is a cosmopolitanism grounded in the social.  
With a few exceptions, cosmopolitanism has always been presented as the standard-
bearer of universalism versus particularism, the expression of the interests of humanity 
against those of this or that local community. Since the Cynics Antisthenes and Dioge-
nes of Sinope – self-declared ‘citizens of the world’ – to the time of the Greek and Ro-
man Stoics, Zeno of Cizio, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, and finally to Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
Kant and the Enlightenment philosophers, cosmopolitanism has always maintained the 
‘particular’, epistemologically and culturally speaking, an impediment to building a uni-
versal human community and universal Reason. Diogenes, for example, repudiated the 
definition of ‘self’ as determined by local origin or by belonging to a particular group. 
On the contrary, he connoted it in its universal sense (Nussbaum 1997, 5). For this tra-
dition of thought, what counted most was the individual above all and, to a certain ex-
tent, the State. These scholars maintained that social relations were not influenced by 
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specific groups or a historical milieu, and that the social setting did not affect progress 
and development in any way. Their conviction has resulted in a focus on the value of 
universal solidarity which welcomes everything, provided it is detached from any spe-
cific social root, and the underestimation of particular elements, national or local, 
which, on the contrary, fix existence to a concrete historic-cultural reality. Such a con-
flicting view has been seriously contested by many intellectual cosmopolitans (the so-
called new cosmopolitans). New cosmopolitans maintain that a reconciliation is not on-
ly possible but that it is extremely necessary (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Pollock et al. 
2000; Hollinger 2001; Turner 2002; Calhoun 2003; Fine 2003; Mazlish 2005; Delanty 
2006). Probably, the outcome would be the resolution of an ontological dichotomy, in 
which often only local experience and lifestyles – implicitly presented as miserable, 
backward, provincial, conservative, naïve and narrow-minded – have been denigrated 
(Tomlinson 1999, 96). 
The conflict between ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘localism’ – briefly mentioned here – 
has obliged cosmopolitanism to account to itself for provoking a rift in its echelons. The 
outcome has been a sharp forking off in two directions: (a) on the one hand, those who 
still have the propensity for a traditional version of cosmopolitanism – which we could 
define as universalist and liberal – who reject the social and all that is local and con-
crete; (b) on the other, those who uphold a version of embedded cosmopolitanism – 
which we prefer to denominate societal – for whom an opening towards a particular 
social milieu, as an embedded element of the universal, would be more opportune.2  
Although the two versions of cosmopolitanism have in common the fact of considering 
the individual as a citizen of the world who is loyal to the world community of human 
beings (Sheffler 1999, 258), the difference between the two is quite evident. While for 
the liberal cosmopolitans diversity is a problem, for the societal cosmopolitans it is a 
‘fact’ to reckon with. If for the former the world can be united without the need for the 
anchorage of particular cultures – except for the Western culture – and the local milieu 
becomes an obstacle to universal solidarity, for the latter, global unity can be achieved 
only by giving importance to those with whom we are closely linked and with whom we 
share customary (even imagined) solidarity. Both versions of cosmopolitanism are dif-
fident with regard to closing out barriers: while for the liberal version these are to be 
 
2There are various ways of denominating this combination, many of which present few or almost im-
perceptible differences, for example: ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Cohen 1992; Ackerman 1994), ‘thin cos-
mopolitanism’ (Dobson 2006), ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Robbins 1998), ‘embedded cosmopoli-
tanism’ (Erskine 2000), ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ (Nielson 1999; Brett and Moran 2011), not to mention 
national interpretations of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Cronin 2003; Calhoun 2006). For a more in-depth 
analysis of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’, see Pendenza (2015a). 
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feared the most, for the societal version they are merely a contingent, fleeting necessi-
ty for intimate and supportive relations (Hollinger 2001, 239). In other words, for socie-
tal cosmopolitanism it is useful to revitalise the tension between its constitutive ideals, 
relating the two, in order to recuperate ‘the local’ – more often declined as ‘national’ – 
without detracting from its universal character. The point is that societal cosmopolitan-
ism rejects a logic of dichotomy, considered inadequate to understanding a reality in 
which every single thing is linked to all the others, and legitimises, on the contrary, the 
dynamic play of the two extremes as it considers them both essential elements of con-
temporary cosmopolitan thought.  
The tension between the concept and the expression related to the cosmopolitan 
approach and its pluralistic effects is the backdrop to our research paper, the nature of 
which is both theoretical and empirical. However, our intention is not that of debating 
a theoretical position which has been clearly delineated in previous works (Pendenza 
2015a) but to use it as a frame within which to analyse our empirical data. We intend 
to attest the theoretical validity of the notion of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ and to 
show that ‘united in diversity’ is not merely a motto of the European Union. To achieve 
this outcome, Eurobarometer 71.3 data will be used (European Commission 2009). We 
aim to show that besides the two predictable clusters of Europeans emerging from the 
findings – that is, the ‘nationalists/locals’ and the ‘cosmopolitans’ (in more limited 
numbers) – there is also another cluster which efficaciously combines a sense of be-
longing to ‘the local’ and openness towards Others and renders concrete the notion of 
‘societal cosmopolitanism’. 
 
 
3. Detecting Cosmopolitan/Local Attitudes in Europe 
 
In our study, we intend to use Eurobarometer data (2009) to detect the extent of 
cosmopolitan attitudes of a ‘societal’ nature from a cross-national perspective relative 
to the citizens of the European Union. Beforehand however, we analyse some empiri-
cal research that has dealt with the constitution of European identity within the theo-
retical frame of cosmopolitanism. In support of our research and from a methodologi-
cal perspective, we are interested mainly in how the authors have worked on and op-
erationalised the concept of cosmopolitanism. In particular, we examine how the no-
tion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ has been associated with that of ‘the local’, that is, how 
widespread is the universalistic and classical conception of cosmopolitanism – one that 
privileges abstract openness towards Others rather than towards one’s own country-
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men – compared to that with a focus on universalism and particularism envisaged not 
as antithetic but as coexistent. 
Roudometof (2005) has thrown new light on the diffusion of a cosmopolitan senti-
ment in a cross-national perspective and has analysed in depth its characteristics com-
pared to a national-local sense of belonging. From a conceptual point of view, he di-
vides, above all, transnationalism from cosmopolitanism.3  For Roudometof, while the 
former ‘is an emergent property that is born out of internal globalization [that does] 
not refer to qualitative feelings or attitudes of individuals’, the latter refers, on the con-
trary, to an attitude which renders people ‘more “open” towards the world’ (Roudo-
metof 2005, 118 and 122). Conceptually, he maintains, furthermore, that the individual 
under the pressure of globalisation expresses sentiments ranging from openness and 
comprehension towards others (cosmopolitan attitudes) to closure and defensive feel-
ings (local or parochial attitudes).4 In this sense, the cosmopolitanism–localism contin-
uum is measured by Roudometof as the attachment to specific places, institutions, cul-
tures and economies, where ‘low’ or ‘high’ values correspond respectively to cosmo-
politan or local attitudes.5 Roudometof is aware that his is an indirect measurement of 
cosmopolitanism, not dissimilar in method to that used for other concepts in sociology. 
However, he considers it a legitimate and valid instrumental tool for working empirical-
ly on the issue. To avoid confusion, Roudometof distinguishes between a rooted cos-
mopolitanism and a thin/cool cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitanism-as-detachment). 
While the former is the outcome of routine transnational experiences, the latter, on 
the contrary, is not linked to a context-specific sense of belonging, but indicates a 
change in values with effects at both local and global levels. In other words, thin cos-
mopolitanism is an attitude towards life and the world not rooted in specifically local 
experiences but in global ones. Obviously, this does not mean that indifference exists 
between the two types of cosmopolitanism. Although Roudometof tends to suggest a 
direct link between local sense of belonging and local attitude, he himself believes that 
‘the existence of universalized, “thin/cool” cosmopolitanism does not necessarily ex-
clude the possibility of rooted or context-specific cosmopolitanism’ (2005, 127). The 
advantage of this point of view, with which we are in agreement, lies in the explicit re-
 
3 This, Roudometof explains, is to avoid falling into the epistemological trap of which Beck (2002) him-
self was a victim, whereby cosmopolitanism is, at the same time, both its own cause and its own effect. 
4 According to Roudometof, transnationalism (i.e. ‘transnational experiences’) is distinguished as a kind 
of infrastructure for cosmopolitanism, although not – in divergence from Beck (2005) – in a deterministic 
sense. Roudometof maintains, in fact, that the relation between the two ‘can (and should) be considered 
an open-ended question’ (2005, 122). 
5 In Roudometof’s words: ‘cosmopolitans and locals occupy the opposite ends of a continuum consist-
ing of various forms of attachment’ (2005, 124). 
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butting of the thesis which excludes any relation whatsoever between ‘cosmopolitan-
ism-as-openness’ and ‘context-specific sense of belonging’. In theory, this approach 
underlines the pluralistic nature of the cosmopolitan attitude for which adhesion to 
universalistic values is not simplistically opposed to the embedded character of daily 
relations. 
The ambivalent nature of the cosmopolitan attitude is grasped effectively by Ol-
ofsson and Öhman (2007). These authors are of the opinion that the concept is far too 
wide to be detected merely by means of a territorial sense of belonging.6 Therefore, 
though on the one hand they do not invalidate Roudometof’s theory, with which they 
in fact concur, on the other hand they operationalise cosmopolitanism using not one 
but two empirical dimensions, capable, in their view, of enhancing its complex nature. 
From a methodological perspective, they distinguish an ‘identity’ dimension of cosmo-
politanism – which they develop empirically by means of the ‘global–local’ continuum – 
from a more ‘cultural’ one, operationalised through the ‘protectionism–openness’ con-
tinuum. The two scales highlight the empirical complexity of cosmopolitanism and by 
combining them Olofsson and Öhman create a four-cluster matrix: ‘local protection-
ists’, ‘open globals’, ‘global protectionists’ and ‘open locals’. The latter cluster is of par-
ticular interest in that it sanctions the coexistence of solidarity towards one’s own 
community and the non-exclusion of outsiders. In other words, the plausibility is con-
firmed both of people’s attachment to their own territory and the enrichment resulting 
from cultural exchanges.  
In line with Olofsson and Öhman, Pichler (2008; 2009a/b; 2011) also considers it 
more opportune to operationalise cosmopolitanism by means of two dimensions ra-
ther than one. The first dimension is what he defines as ‘identity approach’, subjective 
and based on feelings of belonging; the second, more objective, dimension he defines 
as ‘attitudinal’ and relates to particular attitudes towards diversity.7 Furthermore, con-
ceptually Pichler does not deny that cosmopolitanism can indicate, above all, being a 
‘citizen of the world’ and as such is mainly the expression of ‘a sentiment towards a 
community of people beyond national boundaries’ (2009a, 7). Like the other authors, 
however, he acknowledges the coexistence of this sentiment and the sense of proximi-
ty with nearer geographical contexts, although this point of view does not always 
emerge from his empirical works. He declares, for example, that ‘the findings indicate 
 
6 From Merton (1964) onwards, this was the most widespread form of operationalisation of cosmopoli-
tanism. 
7 This dimension was operationalised by Pichler (2009b) by means of only one variable in his research 
using EVS data and by means of two (‘ethical orientation’ and ‘political orientation’) in that using WVS data 
(Pichler 2011). 
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that a large share of people feel close to other Europeans in addition to groups of peo-
ple within the nation-state’ (ibid., 18). In another study, Pichler underlines, in contrast, 
the fact that ‘the stronger the cosmopolitan orientation, the smaller the share of peo-
ple belonging to the locality in the first place’ (2009b, 721). Hence the contradiction 
which, in effect, is only apparent. He is in fact convinced that the issue of the link be-
tween universalism and particularism has not been resolved at all. In other words, ac-
cording to Pichler neither the approach that accepts the coexistence of the two nor the 
contrary approach which rejects such coexistence, can claim to be empirically proved. 
In this respect, the rather rhetorical question he poses – ‘are people really “more cos-
mopolitan” if they feel relatively an attachment to the global?’ (ibid., 726) – would 
seem to confirm this view. Our research starts from this premise. 
 
 
4. Investigating Societal Cosmopolitanism 
 
4.1. Constructing the dependent variable 
 
The 71.3 Eurobarometer (EB) edition (European Commission 2009) will be used to 
prove the existence amongst Europeans of a cluster of societal cosmopolitans, that is, 
people who, although they feel attachment for neighbouring territories, are also open 
towards diversity. To analyse this cluster, which represents the dependent variable, 
two research questions present in the EB have been combined: one linked to ‘cosmo-
politan identity’ (more subjective) and one addressed to detecting cosmopolitan and 
open attitudes on the part of the interviewees (more objective). We define the latter 
as ‘moral cosmopolitanism’.  
Research question no. 1 (‘cosmopolitan identity’): To what extent do you personally 
feel you are… European, national, inhabitant of your region, citizen of the world? Re-
sponses were ranked on a 1–4 point Likert scale. Although there was no query on at-
tachment to ‘local area’, we did however distinguish a sense of belonging which 
marked a more territorial deep-rootedness (‘region’ and ‘country’) compared with that 
of a more cosmopolitan grounding (‘Europe’ and ‘world’). From the combination of re-
sponses concerning the feeling of belonging to the four territories, we measured the 
extent of attachment on a left (negative value) to right (positive value) scale, from re-
gion to world. The resulting 7 point Likert scale provided a range in synthesis indicating: 
(‘-3’) those with a marked sense of belonging to the surrounding territory; (‘+3’) those 
with a marked sense of belonging to distant territories; (‘0’) those with a sense of be-
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longing to both.8 Table 1 shows, in percentages, how the Europeans of the EU-27 are 
ranked on our scale, by individual country and as a whole. 
 
Table 1 –  Distribution of the local–cosmopolitan scale of sense of belonging 
 ←    Local sentiments  Both  Cosmopolitan sentiments  → 
 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5  0  0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
FR 2.4 3.3 9.1 13.4 17.1 16.4  28.0  5.7 3.1 1.2 0.3 0.1 - 
BE 1.0 2.2 4.5 9.7 17.5 18.4  35.7  6.4 2.6 1.4 0.6 0.1 - 
NET 1.2 1.6 7.1 12.3 22.5 21.6  20.7  7.3 3.3 1.4 0.8 0.2 - 
GE-W 2.1 3.5 4.8 14.7 20.4 20.4  22.5  5.9 3.5 1.6 0.6 - - 
IT 2.2 5.2 8.8 16.6 19.5 13.5  25.6  4.9 2.7 0.6 0.3 - - 
LUX 0.2 1.1 3.4 9.5 19.3 12.2  28.8  8.5 8.4 5.9 2.3 0.4 - 
DEN 1.4 1.8 4.5 12.5 22.8 20.3  26.7  6.8 1.8 0.7 0.5 - 0.2 
IR 0.7 2.2 4.9 13.0 26.9 25.0  22.9  2.2 1.0 0.8 0.4 - - 
GB 5.4 4.9 9.6 15.9 17.3 18.7  18.2  4.8 2.7 2.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 
N-IR 1.0 1.8 5.4 17.1 12.3 20.1  24.3  8.7 7.4 0.8 0.9 0.3 - 
GR 3.2 5.3 10.6 16.0 25.8 20.2  16.1  1.4 1.0 0.4 0.1 - - 
SP 1.7 1.6 4.3 6.8 17.7 15.6  41.1  7.4 2.2 1.1 0.1 0.4 - 
PO 2.7 1.5 4.3 10.3 26.7 19.6  29.8  3.1 1.9 0.1 - 0.1 - 
GE-E 1.9 5.2 9.0 20.9 20.4 14.5  21.6  4.9 0.4 0.6 0.5 - 0.1 
FIN 1.4 2.1 8.6 19.6 25.1 21.4  16.1  4.2 1.2 0.3 - - - 
SWE 0.6 0.9 4.5 7.7 22.1 24.4  32.6  5.0 1.7 0.5 0.1 - - 
AUS 1.7 3.8 10.3 19.2 20.1 21.3  18.9  3.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 - - 
CYP 1.1 1.9 9.6 14.1 26.1 25.6  17.9  1.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 - - 
CZ 3.1 7.1 14.5 22.9 21.7 16.9  11.4  1.7 0.7 - - - - 
EST 1.8 2.1 7.5 13.0 24.2 20.2  27.1  2.6 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 - 
HUN 1.6 2.6 7.4 17.0 26.2 23.8  18.7  1.8 0.6 0.3 - - - 
LAT 4.2 4.4 10.3 19.0 23.1 15.2  17.5  3.4 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 - 
LIT 2.8 3.1 7.0 9.6 30.9 23.6  17.5  3.6 1.5 0.3 - - - 
MAL 1.0 0.6 5.1 8.2 20.4 25.0  33.0  3.7 2.8 0.1 - - - 
POL 2.8 4.7 8.9 13.6 23.0 19.5  22.4  3.8 0.8 0.3 0.1 - 0.1 
SK 0.5 1.5 4.1 9.6 22.8 20.0  36.0  3.4 1.2 0.8 - - - 
SI 1.7 2.4 8.4 11.2 21.4 17.6  31.7  3.4 1.6 0.6 0.1 - - 
BUL 8.7 8.3 13.2 15.6 24.7 13.1  14.4  1.1 0.6 0.3 - - - 
ROM 0.3 0.6 2.4 5.3 13.0 27.3  45.2  4.5 0.9 0.2 0.3 - - 
UE-27 2.5 3.6 7.5 13.7 19.9 18.4  25.6  4.9 2.2 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Source: EB 71.3 (2009) 
 
 
8 The scale – borrowed from Recchi’s research on European identity (2013, 197) – was constructed by 
subtracting the combined average score obtained relative to attachment to ‘region’ and ‘country’ from 
that relative to attachment to ‘Europe’ and the ‘world’. In other words, the values are the result of the dif-
ference between the average of the first two territories and that of the other two. For example, someone 
may not be attached in any way to Europe and the world (average score equal to ‘0’), but, conversely, may 
be extremely attached to their ‘country’ and ‘region’ (average score equal to ‘+3’); if ‘+3’ is subtracted 
from ‘0’, the result is ‘-3’, i.e. the maximum value for attachment to local territory. 
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As can be seen, the most frequent response for the EU-27 as a whole is the feeling of 
belonging to the four territories indistinctly (25.6%). Values indicative of local feelings 
(all in the negative range) appear much more frequently than those for cosmopolitan 
feelings (all in the positive range), to the extent that only 9 persons of the 26,577 inter-
viewed indicate a value of ‘+3’ and only 20 persons indicate a value of ‘+2.5’. Values in-
dicative of moderate ‘local’ sentiments (‘-1’ and ‘-0.5’) are the most frequent, with al-
most 4 out of 10 Europeans selecting this category of attachment. Despite marked dif-
ferences between the various countries, the highest percentage of ‘local’ sentiments 
emerged from countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Latvia; the lowest 
percentage emerged in Romania, France, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. Interview-
ees from just 4 countries indicated the maximum value for cosmopolitan identity (‘+3’) 
– Denmark, Great Britain, East Germany and Poland – with few countries presenting 
average or high values (‘+2.5’ and ‘+2’) in this category. 
Research question no. 2 (‘moral cosmopolitan’): Please tell me whether you tend to 
agree or tend to disagree: ‘People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of 
(our country)’.9 Table 2 shows how the opinion of the Europeans on this issue is distrib-
uted. 
 
Table 2 ‘People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our country)’ 
Country 
Tend to 
disagree 
Tend  to 
agree 
 
Country Tend to 
disagree 
Tend  to 
agree 
Malta 92.2 7.8  Germany East 39.1 60.9 
Greece 68.1 31.9  Latvia 37.3 62.7 
Cyprus (Republic) 66.0 34.0  Portugal 36.5 63.5 
Austria 56.5 43.5  Romania 35.6 64.4 
Czech Republic 54.5 45.5  Northern Ireland 33.3 66.7 
Italy 49.5 50.5  Poland 32.0 68.0 
Slovenia 49.5 50.5  Denmark 29.9 70.1 
Hungary 49.0 51.0  France 29.6 70.4 
Belgium 47.1 52.9  Luxembourg 28.4 71.6 
Lithuania 46.6 53.4  Spain 28.4 71.6 
Bulgaria 46.1 53.9  The Netherlands 27.3 72.7 
Slovakia 45.5 54.5  Finland 24.5 75.5 
Ireland 40.4 59.6  Germany West 22.7 77.3 
Great Britain 39.7 60.3  Sweden 15.0 85.0 
Estonia 39.3 60.7  UE-27 36.0 64.0 
Source: EB 71.3 (2009) 
 
9 A similar research question was posed by Mau, Mewes and Zimmerman (2008) to measure openness 
toward difference. 
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The next step in building the dependent variable (i.e. ‘societal cosmopolitanism’) 
was that of cross-tabulating on the matrix the two research questions concerning 
‘cosmopolitan identity’ and ‘moral cosmopolitism’. See Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Societal cosmopolitanism 
 2. Moral cosmopolitanism  
(immigrants enrich cultural life) 
 
 Tend to disagree  Tend to agree  
1. Cosmopolitan identity   Total 
-3 330 163 493 
-2.5 504 284 788 
-2 844 768 1,612 
-1.5 1,375 1,636 3,011 
-1 1,660 2,741 4,401 
-0.5 1,380 2,800 4,180 
0 1,568 4,332 5,900 
0.5 259 946 1,205 
1 113 401 514 
1.5 30 199 229 
2 14 66 80 
2.5 1 17 18 
3 0 9 9 
TOTAL 8,078 14,362 22,440 
Source: EB 71.3 (2009) 
 
As the table shows, in line with the theory of cosmopolitanism, persons with identi-
ties that are detached from the surrounding territory tend to be more open towards 
others, while those more attached to their local territory tend to be in disagreement 
with the statement ‘people from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our 
country)’. The correlation between ‘cosmopolitan identity’ and ‘moral cosmopolitan-
ism’ is thus statistically significant. This means that persons with identity values from ‘-
3’ to ‘-1’ (local) are less likely to believe that the presence of immigrants enriches their 
cultural life, while those with values of ‘-0.5’ upwards (cosmopolitan) are more likely to 
believe it. The focus of our research was to verify, empirically, the presence of persons 
with both a local territory identity and an attitude of moral cosmopolitanism. In Table 
3, the individuals with such characteristics are highlighted in grey – 5,592 cases, almost 
25.0% of those interviewed. 
Again, significant differences between the individual countries emerge regarding the 
variable ‘societal cosmopolitans’. See Table 4. 
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        Table 4 –  Societal cosmopolitans by country 
Country %  Country % 
Finland 39.8  Estonia 23.3 
Bulgaria 34.6  Ireland 21.9 
Latvia 34.1  Italy 20.0 
Germany East 30.4  Slovenia 18.0 
The Netherlands 27.9  Northern Ireland  16.9 
Germany West 27.9  Luxembourg 16.7 
Sweden 27.8  Spain 16.7 
Poland 27.2  Slovakia 16.7 
Czech Republic 26.8  Greece 14.1 
Denmark 24.7  Austria 12.5 
Great Britain 24.3  Cyprus (Republic) 12.3 
France 24.0  Belgium 11.9 
Portugal 23.9  Romania 9.7 
Lithuania 23.8  Malta 2.4 
Hungary 23.6  EU-27 22.9 
Source: EB 71.3 (2009) 
 
In the cases of Finland, Bulgaria and Latvia more than 1 citizen out of 3 emerges as a 
societal cosmopolitan; in contrast, societal cosmopolitanism emerges in fewer than 1 in 
5 citizens from Slovenia, Northern Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Aus-
tria, Cyprus (Republic), Belgium, Romania, and especially Malta. The greater or lesser 
number of persons in this cluster depends, obviously, on the number of people who 
are both attached to their local territory and who have an attitude of openness. How-
ever, the greater weight has to be attributed to ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ (openness), 
given that national differences – in both relative and absolute terms – between the 
number of respondents with local identities are fewer than those detected between 
the number of respondent open attitudes. This explains the 2.4% result for societal 
cosmopolitanism in Malta, where only 7.8% of the population sample considers that 
people from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of one’s country and the 39.8% 
result in Finland, where 75.5% of the sample are moral cosmopolitans.  
 
 
4.2. Constructing the independent variable 
 
Once the dependent variable was built – of a dichotomist nature (‘1’ for those with a 
local identity and at the same time open towards others; ‘0’ for the remaining cases) – 
the next step was to calculate three logistic regression models to discern the factors 
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that favour or hinder the profile of the societal cosmopolitans. New variables were 
then added to each model. The independent variables used were of three types: 
a) Socio-demographic variables (Model 1) 
These are: gender, age, level of instruction, type of residence, political ideology and 
nationality of interviewees (‘1’ for a national of the country, ‘0’ for a foreign national) 
and of their parents (‘1’ if they are nationals of the country, ‘0’ if one or both are for-
eign nationals). From the findings we would expect that better educated people living 
in urban areas would be more cosmopolitan (Pichler 2009b), and likewise foreign na-
tionals. 
b) Elements of national identity (Model 2) 
In this case, various elements are used as dummy variables for the interviewees to 
grade in order of importance, in terms of considering themselves as members of the 
same national community. Some are of a more ‘ethnic’ nature (four elements), others 
of a more ‘civic’ character (four elements): ‘to be Christian’, ‘to share cultural tradi-
tions’, ‘to be born in the country’, ‘to have at least one national parent’, ‘to feel natio-
nal’, ‘to master the official language’, ‘to exercise citizens’ rights’, ‘to have been 
brought up in the country’. Some of these items have already been used in analysing 
cosmopolitanism. Olfosson and Öhman (2007), for example, in order to measure cos-
mopolitanism in Sweden, included in their analysis a research question on the im-
portance of ‘sharing cultural traditions to be Swedish’. 
c) National context (Model 3) 
As pointed out by Vertovec and Cohen (2002) and by Pichler (2009), the State is an 
important player in the formation of cosmopolitan sentiments. Public policies adopted 
in response to issues of globalization, socio-political culture, number of immigrants, 
type of national building, and so on, are significant factors impacting on the degree of 
openness towards others. To take into account such national contexts, using Italy as 
the country of reference, each EU member country was included as a dummy variable. 
 
 
4.3. Findings 
 
Table 5 shows the findings for the three models proposed. The first includes only the 
socio-demographic variable, the second takes into account also the elements of na-
tional identification and the third adds national contexts. The interpretation of the 
odds ratio is simple: values below ‘1’ indicate a negative association between the de-
pendent and independent variables (i.e. the likelihood that the case of a social cosmo-
politan will occur is lower), while values higher than ‘1’ show a positive association. The 
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inclusion of new variables improved the previous model but the most complete case 
was that in which the countries were included, increasing fourfold the explication ca-
pacity of Model 3 compared to Model 2 (R2 increases from 0.014 to 0.066). 
 
      Table 5 – Logistic regression. Dependent variable: ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Socio-demographic variables      
Constant 0.234***  0.187***  0.280*** 
Gendar (ref. male) 0.883***  0.883**  0.889** 
Age (ref. 35 to 44)      
15 to 24 0.761**  0.774**  0.756** 
25 to 34 0.880*     
45 to 54      
55 to 64      
65+ 1.209***  1.224***  1.130* 
Education (ref. students)      
No education      
Primary education 0.774**     
Secondary education      
University      
Ideology (Left-right scale)     0.975** 
Size of community (ref. rural)      
Medium-sized city     0.899** 
Large city 0.880**  0.875**  0.820*** 
National origin interviewee 1.410***  1.393***  1.320** 
National origin both parents 1.233**  1.249**  1.208* 
Elements of national identity      
To be Christian   0.862*   
Share cultural traditions   1.167***  1.161*** 
Be born in the country      
National parentage      
Feeling national   1.161***  1.144*** 
Exercise citizens’ rights      
Grow up in the country   1.131**  1.105* 
Participation      
To master language      
Countries (ref. Italy)      
France      
Belgium     0.390*** 
The Netherlands      
Germany West      
Luxembourg     0.665** 
Denmark      
Ireland     0.704** 
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Great Britain      
Northern Ireland     0.677* 
Greece     0.492*** 
Spain     0.592*** 
Portugal      
Germany East      
Finland     2.004*** 
Sweden      
Austria     0.436*** 
Cyprus (Republic)     0.357*** 
Czech Republic      
Estonia      
Hungary      
Latvia     1.616*** 
Lithuania      
Malta     0.054*** 
Poland      
Slovakia     0.543*** 
Slovenia     0.570*** 
Bulgaria     1.338** 
Romania     0.297*** 
Chi-squared 
R2 Nagelkerke 
n 
131.683*** 
0.010 
18983 
 183.038*** 
0.014 
18983 
 843.343*** 
0.066 
18983 
Odds ratio. Sig: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
Source: EB 71.3 (2009) 
 
As can be seen in Model 1, women, young people, less educated people and those 
who live in large cities are less likely to be societal cosmopolitans; on the contrary, all 
the older people and those born in or with relatives born in the national territory are 
more likely to be so. These findings are predictable if we consider our target cluster: 
people who are more open towards others yet with a deep-rooted attachment to their 
local territory: in other words, people born in the national territory, living in small 
communities rather than large.  
In the second model, previous findings are confirmed – except for the reference to 
the primary level of education, which no longer has significance – with four identity el-
ements appearing as relevant. In particular, to be a Christian does not seem to affect 
the odds of becoming a societal cosmopolitan; conversely, sharing cultural traditions, 
feeling ‘national’ and being brought up in the country – all elements of a more ‘civic’ 
and ‘voluntaristic’ rather than ‘ethnic’ nature – would indicate greater likelihood of be-
coming so. As can be seen, the type of their national identity has a clear impact on the 
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greater or lesser likelihood of people becoming societal cosmopolitans.10 Finally, Model 
3 takes into account national contexts. As shown, 15 of 26 EU member countries are 
statistically different from Italy, also taking into account socio-demographic and na-
tional character variables. Before analysing these differences it should be noted that in 
Model 3 political ideology and the dimensions of the cities gain relevance: those who 
live in medium-sized cities and have a right-wing political orientation are less likely to 
become societal cosmopolitans. Regarding national contexts, the most interesting find-
ing is that except for Finland, Latvia and Bulgaria, all the other countries have in com-
mon that, compared to Italy, their citizens show less likelihood to become societal 
cosmopolitans. The most significant differences are reported by the new members of 
the EU. However, it is possible to detect negative divergences also in the founding 
countries of the EU, as in the case of Belgium and Luxembourg, and in certain Mediter-
ranean countries such as Greece and Spain. Conversely, in other founding countries 
such as The Netherlands and Germany, Northern European countries such as Denmark 
and Sweden, and those of Eastern Europe such as Estonia, Poland and Hungary, the 
odds are not exceedingly different from those of Italy. It is not simple to find an expla-
nation for differences between countries which, in theory, are in close proximity, or to 
explain similarities in countries with historical, economic and cultural profiles that are 
quite different. In any event, our findings show the importance of also taking into ac-
count macro factors in attempting to interpret complex phenomena such as cosmopol-
itanism, as previous studies have shown  regarding Europeanism (García-Faroldi, 2009). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
With reference to the notion of cosmopolitanism, defined as ‘societal’ in previous 
works (Pendenza 2015a/b), our approach was to consider observing the social relations 
of Europeans, starting from the hypothesis that this type of cosmopolitanism – combin-
ing attachment to local territory and openness towards others – exists in concomitance 
with other forms of attitude towards Otherness. The main characteristic of ‘societal 
cosmopolitanism’, which distinguishes it from other concepts of cosmopolitanism, lies 
in the idea that it is not nourished by the abstract principle according to which the sta-
tus of cosmopolitanism can be attributed only if one is (or feels) a ‘citizen of the world’. 
On the contrary, without totally distancing ourselves from such an idea, we are howev-
 
10 This result coincides with Haller’s and Roudometof’s thesis (2010), that there are four items that 
weigh together in the nation-oriented dimension of cosmopolitanism: to have been born and to have been 
brought up in the country, citizenship of the country, and feeling ‘national’. 
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er convinced that if cosmopolitanism is to shrug off its abstraction, it needs social an-
chorage to root it more firmly to real life. The empirical testing of this assumption 
showed that almost 25.0% of the European citizens interviewed possessed such char-
acteristics – that is attachment to local territory and openness towards others (with 
peaks of 30–40% in some countries). 
In this cluster, characteristic elements were mainly the ‘civic’ nature of the national 
model and the fact that the persons involved had been born in and lived in their coun-
try of origin, as had their parents. These two traits could be considered contradictory, 
but that is not the case. Being born in one’s own country certainly represents one of 
the most relevant conditions for loving it, but not to the extent of excluding the possi-
bility that someone else – even if he or she were only brought up in that country – can 
do so. Undoubtedly, a peculiar trait of societal cosmopolitanism is that individuals pro-
fessing this attitude and having deep roots within their particular territory do not re-
buff relations with whomever they consider a source of enrichment of their personal 
and national cultural life, even if not fellow countrymen by birth. Deep-rooted cosmo-
politans are attached to their territory but not in an exclusive manner. Indeed, they are 
inclusive towards others and constantly open to contingencies. Furthermore, the find-
ings from our research confirmed that there is no single way of defining cosmopolitan-
ism, but that, on the contrary, within a more accomplished theory of cosmopolitanism 
there is certainly room for its different forms, coexistent with patriotism and a plural-
istic vision. To date, the theory of cosmopolitanism is still in its embryonic state and the 
implications for future research are manifold. However, cosmopolitan behaviour and 
attitudes are not necessarily triggered from reciprocal connections (or transnational 
experiences, as Roudometof calls them). Notwithstanding, we are certain that if specif-
ic identity policies of a cosmopolitan type are associated with these experiences, then 
some outcomes are perhaps more likely than others. In this context, the implications 
for European cohesion and for cosmopolitan social unity are numerous and could have 
far-reaching results for the future.  
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